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We examine the effect of financial remoteness on foreign direct investment (FDI) using 
a sample of 173 countries over the period 1970-2015. Our results show that financial 
remoteness has a significant negative effect on FDI, which suggests that proximity to 
major financial centres is a key factor in deciding on foreign investments. Our results are 
robust to alternative measures of financial remoteness and controlling for other 
determinants of FDI from the literature.  
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1    Introduction 
Recent literature suggests that the role of distance in determining different levels of financial 
activities cannot be overemphasised. For instance, Malloy (2005) shows that geographically 
proximate analysts perform better than other analysts because the former possess information 
advantage over the latter. In addition, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that fund managers 
earn substantial abnormal returns (an additional return of 2.67 per cent per year) on 
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investments in close proximity while Berger and Woitek (2005) demonstrates that larger 
banks tend to lend at greater distance and they interact more impersonally with their 
borrowers. Similarly, Rose and Spiegel (2009) also show that volatility in growth rates of 
both output and consumption increase with distance from major financial centres. Rose and 
Spiegel (2009) introduced the concept of international financial remoteness which captures 
the natural logarithm of the distance to the nearest major financial centres (New York, 
London or Tokyo). The main advantage of the aforementioned geography-based measure is 
its potential exogeneity. Subsequently, the variable was adopted by Schmitz (2011) who find 
that remote countries tend to have a more positive net external position. Despite the 
importance of proximity to financial centres, there are no empirical studies that directly 
examine the effect of financial remoteness on foreign direct investment (FDI, henceforth). 
We extend the literature by examining the effects of financial remoteness on FDI for a 
panel of 173 countries over the period 1970-2015. We posit that financial remoteness has a 
negative effect on FDI for two reasons. First, a model by Rose and Spiegel (2007) predicts 
that the costs of moving assets to banks located offshore increases with physical distance 
which tends to reduce both the share of offshore banking and competition in the domestic 
banking system from offshore financial centres. Similarly, Degryse and Ongena (2005) show 
that loan rates are increasing in physical distance between the firm and the lending bank 
which results spatial price discrimination. Second, models of Martin and Rey (2004, 2006) 
show that transactions costs for international assets on exchanges tend to be higher than those 
for domestic assets. This shows that in theory, proximity to financial centres has a significant 
effect on lending and transaction costs, which can also extend to foreign direct investment.1 
The intuition motivating this study is that countries that are proximate to financial centres are 
more financially integrated which reducing information asymmetry and agency costs, while 
those further away are less integrated which increases monitoring costs and reduces the 
observability of those managing the investment projects. Combined, this should result in a 
negative relationship between FDI and distance from main financial centres. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, countries that are in proximity to the major financial 
centres (London, New York or Tokyo) have higher levels of foreign direct investment relative 
to those that are more distant. Our results show that financial remoteness has a statistically 
and economically significant negative effect on FDI, as a one standard deviation increase in 
financial remoteness results in an 11% decrease in FDI relative to the sample mean. This 
result is robust to alternative measures of financial remoteness (see definitions in Appendix 
A) and controlling for other factors that affect FDI from the literature. Our results provide 
further evidence on how financial remoteness negatively impacts economic activities. 
                                                 
1 A study by Lin and Png (2003) also find that international investors can reduce these monitoring costs 
which increase with distance by structuring investments further away from home as joint ventures. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents 
some summary statistics. Section 3 introduces the empirical approach. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical findings and robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
2    Data 
Our unbalanced sample consists of 173 countries drawn from the World Bank Database over 
the period 1970-2015. Prior periods have limited observations to allow for meaningful 
analysis. We retain only countries with non-missing data on key variables. Consistent with 
Rose and Spiegel (2009), we also drop the USA, Japan, and the UK as our measure of 
financial remoteness is based on the distance from these three main financial centres. The 
following variables were adopted for the purposes of this study:  
a) Foreign direct investment (fdi) is the dependent variable measured as a percentage of GDP. 
The independent variables follow the extensive literature on FDI such as Chanegriha et al. 
(2017) which shows openness, democratic governance, geographic and coastal locations as 
robust determinants of FDI. They include: 
b) International Financial Remoteness (ldistmbc): This is our main independent variable of 
interest as proposed in Rose and Spiegel (2009). It is measured as the natural logarithm of 
the great-circle distance to closest major financial center (London, New York, or Tokyo). 
Intuitively, nearness to major financial center reduces monitoring and transaction costs and 
thus, encourages foreign direct investment. Therefore, we expect a negative sign on 
ldistmbc. 
c) Political instability (polity2): This is a modified version of the POLITY variable, ranging 
between -10 (total autocracy) and 10 (total democracy). It measures the “intensity” or 
“degree” of democratization in a country, based on underlying variables such as 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraint on 
the chief executive, regulation of participation and competitiveness of political 
participation. Democratic regimes have a positive effect on FDI inflows and thus, we 
expect a positive on polity2 (see, Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). 
d) Trade openness (trade): This variable captures the impact of multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements. In addition, it measures the effect of regional integration. A more open 
economy attracts FDI inflows and hence, trade is expected to have a positive sign. 
e) log of GDP (loggdp) and GDP growth (growth): These variables measure the overall level 
of development of an economy. Although related to the trade and financial sector 
variables, the explanatory powers of loggdp and growth are potentially better as they 
reflect the administrative capacity and institutional quality of an economy. In addition, 
they capture the effects of sectoral variables such as agriculture and manufacturing. loggdp 
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is expected to be negative because FDI is measured as a percentage of GDP; hence, an 
increase in the denominator decreases the overall variable. GDP growth is expected to be 
positive. 
f) Credit to GDP ratio (credit): This is measured as the flow of domestic credit to the private 
sector. It captures the overall development of the banking sector. The relationship between 
FDI flows and domestic credit is generally ambiguous in the literature; while some studies 
have shown a significant positive relationship, others have found no significant 
relationship at all (see, Tsaurai, 2014). Thus, the sign on credit will be determined by the 
regression model. 
g) island is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for countries that are islands and 
otherwise zero, landlis a dummy variable that takes the value of one for countries that are 
landlocked and otherwise zero.2 We include logarithm of latitude (llat) to control for the 
positive link between distance to the equator and economic development which 
consequently affects foreign direct investment (see, Dalgaard and Strulik, 2018).3. 
Table 1 presents the basic statistics (Panel A) and correlations (Panel B) for the variables 
used. The mean (median) FDI, financial remoteness, polity2, log of GDP, growth, credit and 
log of latitude is 3.476 (1.691), 7.735 (7.886), 0.143 (-1 .000), 81.880 (72.020), 23.270 
(23.160), 3.833 (3.897), 34.600 (28.530), and 2.846 (2.944), respectively. As Panel A shows, 
FDI can be negative and this is due three countries (Bermuda, Iraq and Suriname) that are 
experiencing large divestments. 4  The pairwise correlations in Panel B show that FDI is 
positively correlated with trade, growth and credit, while it is negatively correlated with 
financial remoteness (ldistmbc), political regime (polity2), logarithm of GDP (loggdp), and 
logarithm of latitude (llat). The negative correlation of -0.077 between FDI and financial 
remoteness shows an apriori indication that FDI decreases with distance from the main 
financial centres. The other correlations are as expected and consistent with the literature. 
Figure 1a and 1b plots the mean FDI and the scatter plot of FDI and financial remoteness, 
respectively. Figure 1a shows a general increase in FDI over time, while Figure 1b shows a 
general decrease in FDI with financial remoteness. This is consistent with the negative 
correlation in Table 1 and our hypothesis that investors are less willing to invest in remote 
locations as information asymmetry and monitoring costs increase with distance from the 
main financial centres (London, New York or Tokyo). 
                                                 
2 These variables are informed by the literature (see, Asiedu et al., 2015; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; 
Blonigen and Piger, 2014; Farla et al., 2016; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). 
3 Indeed, we acknowledge that there are other potential determinants of FDI; however, most of these 
determinants are highly correlated which may lead to incorrect signs and magnitude of coefficients 
4 Our results are not significantly affected by excluding these countries from our sample. 
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Table 1: Basic statistics and correlations 
Panel A: Basic statistics 
Variable N Mean Stdev Min p25 Meadian p75 Max 
  fdi 5655 3.476 6.499 -58.980 0.479 1.691 4.298 89.480 
  ldistmbc 5655 7.735 0.650 5.188 7.493 7.886 8.163 8.707 
  polity2 5655 0.143 6.982 -10.000 -7.000 -1.000 8.000 10.000 
  trade 5655 81.880 50.240 6.320 49.600 72.020 101.900 531.700 
  loggdp 5655 23.270 2.276 17.280 21.660 23.160 24.930 30.030 
  growth 5655 3.833 5.772 -50.250 1.495 3.897 6.252 150.000 
  credit 5655 38.270 34.600 0.000 13.970 28.530 52.720 312.200 
  llat 5655 2.846 0.950 0.000 2.485 2.944 3.555 4.174 
Panel B: Correlations 
Variable   fdi   ldistmbc   polity2   trade loggdp   growth   credit llat 
  fdi 1.000 
  
ldistmbc -0.077*** 1.000       
polity2 -0.027* -0.241*** 1.000 
trade 0.439*** -0.116*** 0.007 1.000 
loggdp -0.042** -0.373*** 0.170*** -0.140*** 1.000 
growth 0.162*** 0.061*** -0.037** 0.127*** -0.001 1.000 
credit 0.154*** -0.382*** 0.260*** 0.297*** 0.441*** -0.064*** 1.000 
llat -0.012 -0.495*** 0.168*** -0.098*** 0.366*** -0.054*** 0.294*** 1.000 
3    Methodology 
We adopt a panel-data approach to examine the effect of financial remoteness on FDI. The 
following empirical model is employed: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼௝௧ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝐹𝑅௃ + 𝛽𝑋௝௧ + 𝜖௝௧   (1) 
 
where 𝐹𝐷𝐼௝௧  is foreign direct investment (as a percentage of GDP) for country j at time t; 𝛼଴ is 
a constant; 𝛼ଵ  and 𝛽 are parameters to be estimated; 𝐹𝑅௃  is a measure of financial remoteness; 
𝑋௝௧  is a vector of control variables (as previously explained); and 𝜖௝௧  is an error term. The 
vector of control variables includes the political regime (polity2), logarithm of GDP (loggdp), 
and logarithm of latitude (llat). We estimate all our different specification of Equation (1) 
with OLS, using standard errors robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and controlling 
for time-fixed effects. 
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Fig 1: Financial remoteness and foreign direct investment 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Time variations   (b) FDI and financial remoteness 
 
The conventional approach to cross-country FDI regressions is to adopt fixed effects or GMM 
model. However, our main variable of interest (international financial remoteness, ldistmbc) 
is time invariant which means makes the aforementioned approaches unsuitable. While 
ldistmbc has the advantage of plausible exogeneity, we do not overstate the overall strength of 
our results due to potential endogeneity issues. Nevertheless, the addition of time fixed effects 
addresses cross-section dependency, a source of endogeneity in cross-country regressions of 
this nature. Overall, we think the useful insights from unearthing a new significant 
determinant of FDI flows should not be neglected.5 
4    Results 
Table 2 presents results for the eight different specifications of Equation (1) relating FDI to 
financial remoteness and its determinants. In column (1), we examined the “pure” effect of 
financial remoteness on FDI by including only the variable FR. In columns (2) - (7) we 
include all the aforementioned variables (in Section 2). We adopt this approach to ascertain 
the sensitivity of our variables with respect to sign and significance. The results in columns 
(1) - (2) show that financial remoteness has a significant negative effect on FDI. These results 
are economically and statistically significant, as a one standard deviation increase in financial 
remoteness results in a 10% to 14% decrease in FDI relative to the sample mean of 7.735 
(2,287 km). 
                                                 
5 Given potential endogeneity concerns, we also estimated the models using lags of the independent variables. 
These results are similar and are available on request. 
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Table 2: The effects of financial remoteness on FDI 
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ldistmbc -0.725*** -0.656*** -0.593** -0.712*** -0.590*** -0.520*** -0.732** 
(0.190) (0.182) (0.253) (0.182) (0.190) (0.186) (0.309) 
polity2 -0.026** -0.020* -0.033*** -0.027** -0.036*** -0.007 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) 
trade 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
loggdp -0.226*** -0.203*** -0.189*** -0.232*** -0.165** -0.389*** 
(0.053) (0.057) (0.058) (0.052) (0.074) (0.093) 
growth 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.131** 0.084 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.054) (0.071) 
credit 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.007 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
easiapac -0.454* 
(0.243) 
eurcasia 0.064 
(0.258) 
namer 0.309 
(0.407) 
sasia -0.677*** 
(0.236) 
ssafrica 0.331 
(0.232) 
island 0.509** 
(0.253) 
landl -0.279 
(0.251) 
llat 0.109 
(0.085) 
Constant 7.184*** 8.476*** 7.375*** 8.140*** 7.786*** 6.575** 12.260*** 
  (1.528) (1.942) (2.224) (1.957) (2.086) (2.832) (3.093) 
N 5,655 5,655 5,655 5,655 5,655 3,970 1,685 
R^2 0.0913 0.251 0.252 0.251 0.251 0.226 0.276 
 
The other determinants of FDI used as control variables, namely; the political regime 
(polity2), logarithm of GDP (loggdp), and logarithm of latitude (llat), are generally consistent 
with theory and prior studies (e.g., Asiedu et al., 2015; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Blonigen and 
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Piger, 2014). Political instability (polity2) and size of the economy (loggdp) have a negative 
effect on FDI, while openness (trade), growth (growth) and domestic private sector credit 
(credit) have a positive effect. 
5    Robustness 
We check the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we include regional dummies in 
column (3) to examine whether our results are not just merely capturing regional differences 
in FDI. The result shows that financial remoteness has a significant negative effect on FDI 
even after the inclusion of regional categorical dummies (easiapac - Europe, Asia and the 
Pacific; eurcasia - Europe and Central Asia; namer - North America; sasia - South Asia and 
ssafrica - Sub-Saharan Africa). Second, the result in column (4) is also robust to controlling 
for islands and landlocked countries. Third, in column (5), the result remain similarly 
significant after controlling for latitude. Finally, in columns (6) and (7) of Table 2, we also 
examine whether our results are not just capturing differences in the levels of economic 
development. Our results show that countries with high-income levels of economic 
development (column (7)) are even more affected by financial remoteness than those with 
low-income levels (column (6)).6 Overall our results show a significant negativity effect of 
financial remoteness on FDI that is robust to alternative specifications and measures of 
financial remoteness (see Appendix A). 
6    Conclusions 
We empirically examine the effects of financial remoteness on FDI, while controlling for 
other determinants of FDI from the literature. Our results show that financial remoteness has a 
statistically and economically significant negative effect on FDI. This result suggests that 
proximity to financial centres is an important factor that is also considered by foreign 
investors beyond the other factors in the FDI literature. Further research could examine the 
robustness of the relationship between international financial remoteness and FDI using a 
combination of other explanatory variables and the application of other econometric 
methodologies. 
Disclaimer statement 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the World Bank, its Executive Board, or World Bank Management. 
                                                 
6  Appendix A shows that our results are robust to alternative definitions of financial remoteness. The 
coefficients for the alternative measures of financial remoteness are lower as the closest or average distance to 
several financial centres is lower than that to the three main centres (London, New York and Tokyo). These 
alternative measures of remoteness are based on Rose and Spiegel (2009). 
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Appendix A : Alternative measures of financial remoteness 
The table below presents the results estimating Equation (1) that relates FDI to alternative 
measures of financial remoteness and control variables. Consistent with Rose and Spiegel 
(2009), the alternative measures of financial remoteness used are:  
ofcmingr is the distance to closest offshore financial center (Column (1));  
lbig8min is the distance to the closest eight largest gross debtors (Column (2));  
lbig10min is the distance to the closest ten largest gross creditors (Column (3));  
lmind55 is the distance to the closest ten countries with the largest gross capital outflows 
(Column (4));  
lmindv55 is the distance to the closest ten countries with largest gross capital inflows 
(Column (5));  
lbig8wavg is the average distance to the eight largest gross debtors (Column (6));  
lwbig10avg is the average distance to the ten largest gross creditors (Column (7));  
lavgd55 is the average distance to the ten countries with largest gross capital outflows 
(Column (8));  
lavgdv55 is the average distance to the ten countries with largest gross capital inflows 
(Column (9));  
wsldistmbc is the weighted distance to major financial centres with host transactions as 
weights (Column (10)).  
The controls are political instability (polity2), trade openness (trade), log of GDP (loggdp), 
GDP growth (growth) and credit to GDP ratio (credit). 
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Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
FR Measure ofcmingr lbig8min lbig10min lmind55 lmindv55 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FR -0.186** -0.282** -0.273** -0.381** -0.279** 
(0.081) (0.134) (0.130) (0.150) (0.125) 
polity2 -0.018* -0.022** -0.022** -0.024** -0.022** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
trade 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
loggdp -0.164*** -0.203*** -0.203*** -0.218*** -0.201*** 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
growth 0.121** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
credit 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 3.263** 5.003*** 4.933*** 6.094*** 4.910*** 
  (1.472) (1.657) (1.644) (1.772) (1.586) 
N 5,655 5,655 5,655 5,655 5,655 
R^2 0.248 0.248 0.248 0.249 0.248 
 
FR Measure lbig8wavg lwbig10avg lavgd55 lavgdv55 wsldistmbc 
Variables (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
FR -0.842*** -0.577*** -0.408** -0.397** -0.261** 
(0.238) (0.222) (0.174) (0.173) (0.117) 
polity2 -0.020* -0.019* -0.020* -0.019* -0.020* 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
trade 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
loggdp -0.201*** -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.191*** -0.166*** 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
growth 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122** 0.126*** 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) 
credit 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 7.862*** 6.137*** 5.997*** 5.857*** 4.157*** 
  (1.863) (1.858) (1.905) (1.893) (1.269) 
N 5,655 5,655 5,655 5,655 5,598 
R^2 0.249 0.248 0.248 0.248 0.251 
 
  
Review of Economic Analysis 11 (2019)  219-232 
 230
Appendix B : Middle low- and low-income countries 
Panel A: High Income  Panel B: Upper Middle Income 
Country N FDI ldistmbc Country N FDI ldistmbc 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
38 10.315 7.491 Albania 24 5.259 7.083 
Australia 46 2.224 8.378 Algeria 23 0.422 7.396 
Austria 46 1.822 6.496 Angola 20 7.000 8.424 
Bahamas, The 27 4.031 7.046 Argentina 45 1.535 8.556 
Bahrain 34 4.950 8.056 Azerbaijan 21 17.775 7.763 
Barbados 35 3.065 7.648 Belarus 24 1.960 7.073 
Belgium 14 12.046 5.188 Belize 32 5.114 7.521 
Bermuda 5 -0.028 6.655 Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
17 4.081 6.886 
Brunei 15 2.556 7.894 Botswana 41 3.127 8.571 
Canada 46 2.225 7.378 Brazil 34 2.082 8.218 
Chile 41 4.497 8.495 Bulgaria 26 6.669 7.171 
Croatia 20 4.098 6.724 China 34 2.936 7.575 
Cyprus 36 4.719 7.593 Colombia 46 2.090 7.841 
Czech Republic 23 4.544 6.533 Costa Rica 39 3.371 7.701 
Denmark 46 1.539 6.238 Dominica 35 7.026 7.554 
Estonia 20 8.341 7.035 Dominican Rep.  46 2.541 7.325 
Finland 46 1.844 7.148 Ecuador 40 1.138 7.993 
France 46 1.293 5.967 Equatorial 
Guinea 
19 16.412 8.15 
Greece 28 0.807 7.218 Fiji 37 4.587 8.381 
Hong Kong 18 26.509 7.493 Gabon 38 1.391 8.213 
Hungary 24 8.504 6.856 Georgia 19 8.146 7.661 
Iceland 39 1.919 7.029 Grenada 34 8.387 7.657 
Ireland 42 9.234 5.867 Guyana 39 6.242 7.878 
Israel 46 1.772 7.71 Iran 22 0.667 7.993 
Italy 46 0.533 6.741 Iraq 21 -0.023 7.837 
Korea 40 0.639 6.535 Jamaica 22 1.019 7.359 
Kuwait 21 0.434 7.929 Jordan 40 4.073 7.743 
Latvia 20 4.227 6.975 Kazakhstan 24 7.143 7.983 
Lithuania 20 3.311 6.929 Lebanon 16 9.750 7.676 
Luxembourg 10 23.524 5.689 Libya 11 2.226 7.619 
Macao 31 4.511 7.513 Macedonia 22 3.742 7.114 
Malta 33 3.998 7.169 Malaysia 46 3.785 7.965 
Netherlands 46 10.143 5.536 Maldives 14 7.966 8.473 
New Zealand 37 2.294 8.651 Mauritius 39 1.413 8.707 
Norway 46 1.606 6.703 Mexico 46 1.775 7.618 
Oman 26 1.541 8.211 Namibia 30 4.178 8.552 
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Appendix B : Middle low- and low-income countries (continued) 
Panel A: High Income  Panel B: Upper Middle Income 
Country N FDI ldistmbc Country N FDI ldistmbc 
Poland 25 3.057 6.748 Palau 21 7.613 7.588 
Portugal 46 2.095 6.816 Panama 38 4.606 7.707 
Qatar 15 3.028 8.073 Paraguay 25 1.348 8.416 
Saudi Arabia 46 1.164 7.999 Peru 46 2.201 8.163 
Seychelles 39 9.724 8.529 Russia 24 1.808 7.795 
Singapore 46 12.224 8.103 South Africa 46 0.827 8.656 
Slovak Republic 23 3.495 6.783 St. Lucia 35 9.896 7.607 
Slovenia 20 1.852 6.658 Vincent & 
Grenadines 
38 9.758 7.627 
Spain 46 1.983 6.705 Suriname 40 -4.748 7.928 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
36 12.348 7.468 Thailand 41 2.094 7.95 
Sweden 46 2.588 6.82 Turkey 42 0.824 7.54 
Switzerland 33 3.236 6.164 Turkmenistan 20 7.078 7.975 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
46 5.785 7.698 Venezuela 44 1.022 7.748 
UAE 15 3.091 8.131 Total 1,546 3.811 7.871 
Uruguay 46 1.908 8.56     
Total 1,685 4.343 7.209     
 
Appendix C : Middle low- and low-income countries 
Panel C: Middle Low Income    Panel D: Low Income 
Country N FDI ldistmbc Country N FDI ldistmbc 
Armenia 24 4.681 7.726 Afghanistan 13 1.440 8.14 
Bangladesh 44 0.373 8.024 Benin 46 1.083 7.973 
Bhutan 14 1.728 7.98 Burkina Faso 46 0.552 7.886 
Bolivia 46 2.764 8.301 Burundi 17 0.150 8.339 
Cabo Verde 28 4.523 7.931 CAR 39 0.971 8.1 
Cambodia 22 6.210 7.889 Chad 39 4.185 7.912 
Cameroon 39 1.158 8.075 Comoros 28 0.873 8.542 
Congo 38 7.524 8.223 Eritrea 16 4.530 8.104 
Cote d’Ivoire 41 1.235 8.011 Ethiopia 5 2.392 8.214 
Djibouti 17 3.224 8.204 Gambia 20 1.255 7.931 
Egypt 39 2.446 7.74 Guinea 29 2.599 7.955 
El Salvador 40 1.313 7.633 Guinea-Bissau 32 1.306 7.956 
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Appendix C : Middle low- and low-income countries (continued) 
Panel C: Middle Low Income    Panel D: Low Income  
Country N FDI ldistmbc Country N FDI ldistmbc 
Ghana 41 2.628 8.008 Haiti 19 1.024 7.318 
Guatemala 39 1.030 7.600 Liberia 19 34.410 8.056 
Honduras 42 2.856 7.566 Madagascar 46 2.174 8.646 
India 41 0.733 8.273 Malawi 46 1.984 8.502 
Indonesia 35 0.975 8.035 Mali 45 1.221 7.779 
Kenya 46 0.634 8.324 Mozambique 35 7.052 8.567 
Kiribati 31 0.600 8.064 Nepal 20 0.216 8.093 
Kyrgyz Republic 23 5.097 8.145 Niger 46 2.448 7.820 
Lao 28 3.392 7.802 Rwanda 46 0.941 8.316 
Lesotho 5 0.490 8.674 Senegal 46 1.229 7.902 
Mauritania 45 3.894 7.727 Sierra Leone 46 2.499 8.019 
Moldova 20 5.189 7.195 Tanzania 26 3.130 8.406 
Mongolia 25 8.467 7.566 Togo 42 2.427 8.007 
Morocco 46 1.062 7.222 Uganda 28 2.949 8.281 
Nicaragua 46 2.803 7.616 Zimbabwe 41 0.906 8.567 
Nigeria 46 2.608 7.972 Total 881 2.667 8.128 
Pakistan 46 0.749 8.239     
Papua New Guinea 35 4.062 7.978     
Philippines 46 1.097 7.559     
Samoa 22 1.834 8.437     
Solomon Islands 25 4.814 8.090     
Sri Lanka 46 0.895 8.341     
Sudan 44 1.626 8.011     
Swaziland 43 3.663 8.650     
Syria 29 0.716 7.691     
Tajikistan 24 3.325 8.135     
Tonga 32 1.881 8.486     
Tunisia 40 2.423 7.161     
Ukraine 24 2.916 7.252     
Uzbekistan 24 1.307 8.018     
Vanuatu 35 7.646 8.290     
Vietnam 30 5.086 7.816     
Yemen 25 1.323 8.200     
Zambia 22 5.360 8.503     
Total 1,543 2.656 7.95     
 
